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Abstract 
 In this project, I examine the operation of the sublime and the unconscious in 
Moby Dick. In the sublime, I locate the source of Ahab’s obsession with, and Ishmael’s 
interest in, Moby Dick. Through sublime experiences, these characters confront the limits 
of human understanding. Ishmael accepts this limitation, but Ahab rejects it, choosing to 
pursue Moby Dick in an effort to reassert order in an entropic universe. He blames his 
loss of control on the whale, which becomes his objet petit a: that object, according to 
Lacan, that distracts the obsessive from the true source of his anxiety. Employing 
Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, I compare Ahab’s and Ishmael’s reactions to the 
sublime, and how these reactions determine their fates. 
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Introduction 
The Whale-Line 
  
Ishmael describes the whale-line, a rope which covers almost the entire ship, 
“twisting and writhing around it in almost every direction” (Melville 253). It is common, 
Ishmael tells us, for this line to entrap a whaler and drag him over the side of the ship to 
his death. At the end of the chapter, Ishmael explains that a whale-line entangles all 
humanity: 
All men live enveloped in whale-lines. All are born with halters around 
their necks; but it is only when caught in the swift, sudden turn of death, 
that mortals realize the silent, subtle, ever-present perils of life. And if you 
be a philosopher, though seated in the whale-boat, you would not at heart 
feel one whit more of terror, than though seated before your evening fire 
with a poker, and not a harpoon, by your side. (254) 
Ishmael impresses on his reader the frailty of human beings: the philosopher is just as 
aware of the “ever-present perils of life” as the whaler. This frailty is emphasized by the 
enormity of the whale itself. The leviathan Moby Dick leaves Ishmael feeling small: “For 
in the mere act of penning my thoughts of this Leviathan, they weary me, and make me 
faint with their outreaching comprehensiveness” (406). The experience of human 
vulnerability permeates Moby Dick, and I argue, is the primary cause of Ahab’s mad 
obsession. 
 As the immensity of the whale makes Ishmael “weary,” the immensity of Moby 
Dick should make the reader feel the same. As a hermeneutic project, Moby Dick is 
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substantial. The task of interpreting its ambiguous symbols and characters is reminiscent 
of the task of describing the appearance of whales, according to Ishmael: “For all these 
reasons, then, any way you may look at it, you must conclude that the great Leviathan is 
that one creature in the world which must remain unpainted to the last. True, one portrait 
may hit the mark  much nearer than another, but none can hit it with any very 
considerable degree of exactness” (240). The word “unpainted” is polysemous here, 
indicating not only the whale’s refusal to be interpreted but his physical whiteness: “[S]o 
mystical and well nigh ineffable was it, that I almost despair of putting it in a 
comprehensible form. It was the whiteness of the whale that above all things appalled 
me” (168). This ambiguity invites an obsessive pursuit: for Ishmael, one of interpretation 
and for Ahab, one of revenge. 
 Moby Dick, as both whale and book, refuses to be interpreted. This ambiguity 
exists in several objects: the sea, the whale, and Ahab. Each of these objects presents a 
semiotic challenge to its interpreter. Often in Moby Dick, the interpreter, when faced with 
these objects, has a sublime experience and is reminded of the insufficiency of his senses. 
One response to a reminder that human perception is inadequate is awe, reverence, and 
humility. Another is denial, rejection, and arrogance. The first aligns with Ishmael’s 
reaction, and the second with Ahab’s. Though Ishmael does not become wholly obsessed 
with the pursuit of Moby Dick, he flirts with obsession, and his fanatical categorizing and 
describing of whales reflect this. Ishmael and Ahab exhibit different but not necessarily 
opposite reactions when faced with the immensity of whales and of the sea they inhabit. 
 Ahab’s reaction to the possibility that his senses may be inadequate, a consuming 
obsession with Moby Dick, is similar, in Lacanian terms, to the reaction of a castrated 
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subject, who loses jouissance and looks to the Other and the objet petit a to find it. It is 
my intention to examine Ahab’s trauma and subsequent obsession through a Lacanian 
lens for this reason. However, I will first give an extended and close reading of Moby 
Dick, paying attention to the sublime and the unconscious, before turning to my 
psychoanalytic methodology. It will be necessary to examine dominant conceptions of 
the sublime and the unconscious in Moby Dick before relating these to Lacanian 
psychoanalytic theory. 
   
Chapter 1 
Melville and His Unshored Harborless Immensities 
 
A Boggy, Soggy, Squitchy Picture of Whales 
  
Ishmael experiences the incomprehensibility of whales even before he boards the 
Pequod. In the Spouter-Inn, he encounters: 
a very large oil painting so thoroughly besmoked, and every way defaced, 
that in the unequal crosslights by which you viewed it, it was only by 
diligent study and a series of systematic visits to it, and careful inquiry of 
the neighbors, that you could any way arrive at an understanding of its 
purpose . . . A boggy, soggy, squitchy picture truly, enough to drive a 
nervous man distracted. Yet was there a sort of indefinite, half-attained, 
unimaginable sublimity about it that fairly froze you to it, till you 
involuntarily took an oath with yourself to find out what that marvelous 
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painting meant. Ever and anon a bright, but, alas, deceptive idea would 
dart you through . . . But stop; does it not bear a faint resemblance to a 
gigantic fish? even the great leviathan himself? (Melville 9-10) 
Ishmael eventually determines that the painting is of “a Cape-Horner in a great hurricane; 
the half-foundered ship weltering there with its three dismantled masts alone visible; and 
an exasperated whale, purposing to spring clean over the craft, is in the enormous act of 
impaling himself upon the three mast-heads” (10). He admits that this is just a “theory . . . 
partly based upon the aggregated opinions of many aged persons with whom [he] 
conversed upon the subject” (10). The painting is indistinct, or as Ishmael puts it, “boggy, 
soggy,” and “squitchy.” The “indefinite, half-attained, unimaginable sublimity” of the 
painting follows Ishmael throughout his story, extending into his physical encounters 
with whales while aboard the Pequod. His impressions of the leviathan, like his 
impressions of the painting, are amorphous, indefinite. Ishmael’s opinion of whales 
seems in constant flux; as Carol Colatrella points out, “It becomes difficult to distinguish 
between victims and villains: is that whale a magnificently divine creature or a monster?” 
(Colatrella 166). Ishmael has not worked through his experiences before sitting down to 
write Moby Dick; Moby Dick is this “working through.” As Ishmael writes, he relives his 
experiences, hoping to shed some light on them not only for his reader, but for himself. 
As Ishmael works to uncover the meaning of leviathans, he finds that it is just as 
elusive in direct encounters as in the Spouter-Inn painting: leviathans and the ocean they 
inhabit are unknowable. Despite Ishmael’s relentless quest for understanding, the futility 
of this quest is apparent and observable in those chapters dedicated to the scientific study 
of whales. Ishmael devotes much discussion to whaling history, whale mythology, and 
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four chapters on whale anatomy. Though Ahab is our most obvious obsessive case, 
Ishmael too exhibits an obsession, one which might be more apparent if it were not set 
alongside extreme Ahab: Ishmael is obsessed with understanding, and specifically, 
understanding whales. The purpose of Ishmael’s comprehensive documentation of whale-
knowledge, exemplified in those chapters dedicated exclusively to the cataloguing and 
anatomizing of whales, is ambiguous. Charles Olson in Call Me Ishmael suggests that 
Melville uses them to control the pace of the plot: 
The body of the book supports the bulk of the matter on the Sperm 
whale—“scientific or poetic.” Melville carefully controls these chapters, 
skillfully breaking them up: the eight different vessels the Pequod meets 
as she moves across the ocean slip in and out between the considerations 
of cetology. Actually and deliberately the whaling chapters brake the 
advance of the plot. Van Wyck Brooks calls them “ballast.” (Olson 67-
68). 
While these extended pauses may be examples of narratological devices at work, they are 
also a symptom of Ishmael’s experiences. Our first question should be, why does Ishmael 
tell his story this way? For Ishmael, reliving his experiences on the Pequod must be 
painful, and thus, one possible purpose for the cetology chapters is to intentionally delay 
reliving the final destruction of the Pequod and its men. Moby Dick is meant to be 
organic: not just a telling but a reliving of Ishmael’s story. 
Another possible reason for including these chapters is that Ishmael gathers 
knowledge as a way to understand his trauma; Moby Dick is a cathartic project. When 
Ishmael first interviews to join the Pequod’s crew, Captain Peleg asks, “Dost know 
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nothing at all about whaling, I dare say—eh?” to which Ishmael responds, “Nothing Sir; 
But I have no doubt I shall soon learn” (Melville 63). He must, therefore, learn what he 
knows about cetology and whaling history after his experience on the Pequod, which 
seems strange. Logically, Ishmael should want nothing to do with whales after losing his 
friends and fellow whalers to one. Moby Dick leaves Ishmael stranded in the middle of 
the ocean, an “orphan.” But Ishmael embraces whales, learning everything he can about 
whale anatomy and the exploits of other whaling voyages. Even before the cetology 
chapters, Ishmael begins Moby Dick by translating “whale” into thirteen languages and 
giving pages of extracts about whales from a variety of sources including the Bible and 
Shakespeare. Knowledge, for Ishmael, coupled with the cathartic experience of writing 
Moby Dick, is a way to possess his own trauma and control it. 
Ishmael admits to the inadequacy of his account of whale anatomy and 
categorization in “Cetology,” and practically apologizes for not providing a more 
thorough examination:  
Finally: It was stated at the outset, that this system would not be here, and 
at once, perfected. You cannot but plainly see that I have kept my words. 
But now I leave my cetological system standing thus unfinished, even as 
the great Cathedral of Cologne was left, with the crane still standing upon 
the top of the uncompleted tower. For small erections may be finished by 
their first architects; grand ones, true ones, ever leave the copestone to 
posterity. God keep me from ever completing anything. This whole book 
is but a draught—nay, but the draught of a draught. Oh, Time, Strength, 
Cash, and Patience. (128) 
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His own attempts to scientifically describe whales dissatisfy him. He eventually 
concludes that it is absurd to even try to understand the leviathan through a museum 
exhibit or anatomy book: 
How vain and foolish, then, thought I, for timid untraveled man to try to 
comprehend aright this wondrous whale, by merely poring over his dead 
attenuated skeleton, stretched in this peaceful wood. No. Only in the heart 
of quickest perils; only when within the eddyings of his angry flukes; only 
on the profound unbounded sea, can the fully invested whale be truly and 
livingly found out. (405) 
Although Ishmael has been “in the heart of quickest perils,” he still researches whales, 
believing that his experiences alone do not provide adequate insight into them. Though he 
exhaustively studies whales, he admits his inadequacy in penetrating their mysteries. If 
Ishmael, with his whaling experience and scientific knowledge cannot comprehend the 
leviathan, does his reader have a chance? As Ishmael’s encounter with the painting in the 
Spouter-Inn indicates, whales, and the water they inhabit, are unknowable. 
In “The Sphynx,” Ahab expresses a similar desire to know the unknowable. He 
addresses the head of a decapitated and gutted sperm whale that hangs over the side of 
the ship, bobbing half in and half out of the water: “‘Speak, thou vast and venerable 
head,’ muttered Ahab, ‘which though ungarnished with a beard, yet here and there 
lookest hoary with mosses; speak, mighty head, and tell us the secret thing that is in thee. 
Of all divers, thou hast dived the deepest. That head upon which the upper sun now 
gleams, has moved amid this world’s foundations” (279-280). Ishmael compares the head 
to that of the Sphynx, “hanging there in the midst of so intense a calm” (279). The 
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reasons for this comparison become clear as Ahab continues his address, speculating 
about what secret things the whale has seen in “that awful water-land”: murder, mutinies, 
the death-leaps of lovers, and the sinking of ships (280). Ahab perceives the whale’s 
home as a terrible wasteland harboring only death, yet he pleads with the whale to share 
history’s secrets: “O head! thou hast seen enough to split the planets and make an infidel 
of Abraham, and not one syllable is thine!” (280). He is only shaken from his apostrophe 
by a “Sail ho!” from the main mast head, at which point “whole thunderclouds swept 
aside from his brow” (280). Ahab ends his monologue and this short chapter saying, “O 
Nature, and O soul of man! how far beyond all utterance are your linked analogies; not 
the smallest atom stirs or lives on matter, but has its cunning duplicate in mind” (280). 
While this last exclamation is ambiguous, with no immediately recognizable reference to 
his recent speech, it seems likely that he alludes to the whale and himself, respectively, 
when he addresses “nature” and the “soul of man,” and also that he recognizes a chasm 
between these. 
 
A Strange Analogy 
 
As illustrated by his speech in “The Sphynx,” Ahab perceives the whale to be a 
source of information on the inscrutable, unchanging sea itself. Not only has the whale 
seen unfathomable depths “where bell or diver never went,” these depths are his “most 
familiar home” (280). Ahab’s opinion of the sea here echoes an earlier assessment of 
Ishmael’s: 
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Consider the subtleness of the sea; how its most dreaded creatures glide 
under the water, unapparent for the most part, and treacherously hidden 
beneath the loveliest tints of azure. Consider also the devilish brilliance of 
beauty of many of its most remorseless tribes, as the dainty embellished 
shape of many species of sharks. Consider, once more, the universal 
cannibalism of the sea; all whose creatures prey upon each other, carrying 
on eternal war since the world began. (248) 
In both of these analyses, the sea is an unknowable, dangerous entity, an obvious 
conclusion, supported by the fear sailors have of the sea: “Mark, how when sailors in a 
dead calm bathe in the open sea—mark how closely they hug their ship and only coast 
along her sides” (371). In Ishmael's analysis, not only is the sea dangerous, it is 
deceptive, concealing “dreaded creatures . . . beneath the loveliest tints of azure.” Its 
outward beauty, like the “dainty embellished shape” of sharks, is matched by an inner 
horror: an ongoing “cannibalism.” This terrible image of sea creatures consuming one 
another agrees with Ahab’s conception of the sea as a death-ridden wasteland. Though 
Ishmael’s analysis of the sea is similar to Ahab’s in that the sea represents some 
unknowable, malicious entity, these are different in a crucial way: Ishmael sees the 
brutality of the sea and the gentleness of the land as mirroring two forces within the 
human soul: 
Consider all this; and then turn to this green, gentle, and most docile earth; 
consider them both, the sea and the land; and do you not find a strange 
analogy to something in yourself? For as this appalling ocean surrounds 
the verdant land, so in the soul of man there lies one insular Tahiti, full of 
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peace and joy, but encompassed by all the horrors of the half known life. 
God keep thee! Push not off from that isle, thou canst never return! (248) 
In Ishmael’s analogy, there is an island “full of peace and joy” in each soul that is 
surrounded by the sea, which conversely represents “all the horrors of the half known 
life.” He suggests that one has a choice whether to venture from this inner island, and he 
recommends that one does not, because “thou canst never return!” While Ishmael 
recognizes the same conflict between the human soul and the sea that Ahab does, he sees 
this conflict mirrored within the human soul itself.  
 When Pip plunges into the ocean and subsequently goes mad in “The Castaway,” 
he physically acts out the metaphor for madness that Ishmael has proposed. Pip wanders 
from the “verdant land,” or in this case the safety of the row boat, and ventures into the 
“appalling ocean” where he encounters its terrors. Pip first leaps into the water after a 
whale jostles the row boat, in the “involuntary consternation of the moment” (370). As he 
leaps, he becomes entangled in the whale line, and as the whale swims away, it drags Pip 
along behind it. Tashtego cuts the line, thus saving Pip, but Stubb warns him that if he 
jumps a second time, he will not be saved. The second time Pip leaps into the ocean, 
Ishmael tells us, “Alas! Stubb was but to true to his word . . . No boat knife was lifted 
when he fell so rapidly astern” (371). The Pequod eventually saves Pip, but the hour he 
spends “bobbing up and down in that sea” drives him mad, and thereafter he goes “about 
the deck an idiot” (371). 
 Ishmael explains that while Pip is floating alone in the middle of the ocean, his 
soul drowns but his body remains afloat: “The sea had jeeringly kept his finite body up, 
but drowned the infinite of his soul” (371). He then qualifies the word “drowned”: 
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Not drowned entirely, though. Rather carried down alive to wondrous 
depths, where strange shapes of the unwarped primal world glided to and 
fro before his passive eyes; and the miser-merman, Wisdom, revealed his 
hoarded heaps; and among the joyous, heartless, ever-juvenile eternities, 
Pip saw the multitudinous, God-omnipresent, coral insects, that out of the 
firmament of waters heave the colossal orbs. He saw God’s foot upon the 
treadle of the loom, and spoke it; and therefore his shipmates called him 
mad. So man’s insanity is heaven’s sense; and wandering from all mortal 
reason, man comes at last to that celestial thought, which, to reason, is 
absurd and frantic; and weal or woe, feels then uncompromised, 
indifferent as his God. (371-372) 
Ishmael implies that Pip sees what no mortal can see without going mad: “man’s insanity 
is heaven’s sense.” Man cannot arrive at “that celestial thought” without first “wandering 
from all mortal reason.” Consequently, the sea’s secrets are destined to remain secret, 
because even if one man learns them, no other will believe or understand his “absurd and 
frantic” ramblings. 
 The sea in Ishmael’s metaphor, and in Pip’s experience, plays two roles at once. It 
simultaneously represents the physical terrors of the ocean and the terrors within the 
human soul. Pip faces both of these while he is lost at sea. Ishmael first attributes Pip’s 
madness specifically to the loneliness he encounters: “Now, in calm weather, to swim in 
the open ocean is as easy to the practised swimmer as to ride in a spring-carriage ashore. 
But the awful lonesomeness is intolerable. The intense concentration of self [emphasis 
added] in the middle of such a heartless immensity, my God! who can tell it?” (371). The 
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phrase “concentration of self” is peculiar here, because it suggests that loneliness is 
defined by an abundance of self, not the absence of others. Pip only encounters himself 
while out at sea, and this encounter plays a part in driving him mad. Ishmael then 
attributes Pip’s madness to his encounter with external influence; Pip sees “God’s foot 
upon the treadle of the loom” and “the multitudinous, God-omnipresent, coral insects, 
that out of the firmament of waters heave the colossal orbs.” Thus, the underlying cause 
of Pip’s madness is uncertain. Does loneliness drive Pip mad, or does he go mad as a 
result of his encounter with nature or God? In other words, is the source of Pip’s madness 
internal or external? Ishmael does not let his reader accept one and exclude the other, and 
his elusive language reflects this: the seemingly contradictory phrase “joyous, heartless, 
ever-juvenile eternities,” for example, demonstrates how difficult it is to assess with 
certainty any element of Pip’s experience. The possible interpretations of this experience 
are as “multitudinous” as the “coral insects” Pip sees. Pip’s madness seems to be a result 
of internal and external influences simultaneously. Whether the sea functions 
independently as an element of nature or God, or within Ishmael’s madness metaphor, it 
is equally ambiguous in each case. Out at sea, the human soul and nature intersect: Pip 
comes face-to-face with both the infinity of the sea and himself, and these in conjunction 
make him mad. 
 Ishmael’s analogy for madness, in which a person wanders from the island in their 
mind into the ocean, suggests that everyone has the potential to go mad. Each human 
being has an unknowable portion to his soul. The appearance of madness is determined 
by whether he wanders into this darkness. Ishmael makes this division explicit: “The sea 
had kept his finite body up, but drowned the infinite of his soul.” We see this division 
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between body and soul later, in “Queequeg in His Coffin” when Pip takes dying 
Queequeg’s hand and says, 
Poor rover! will ye never have done with all this weary roving? where go 
ye now? But if the current carry ye to those sweet Antilles where the 
beaches are only beat with water-lilies, will ye do one little errand for me? 
Seek out one Pip, who’s now been missing long: I think he’s in those far 
Antilles. If ye find him, then comfort him; for he must be very sad; for 
look! he’s left his tambourine behind;—I found it. Rig-a-dig, dig, dig! 
Now, Queequeg, die; and I’ll beat ye your dying march. (427-428) 
Pip maintains that while his body was saved, his soul was lost: the essence of Pip is gone, 
presumably to some afterlife where the dying Queequeg might encounter him. Pip speaks 
as though his soul, having been drowned, is not only separated from him but dead. 
Pip’s experience and his subsequent madness embody Ishmael’s analogy in which one 
must wander from finite safety into infinite danger. 
 Ishmael’s metaphor for madness and Pip’s experience exhibit a characteristic of 
gothic stories: the representation of psychic states in landscapes. The land, and its 
extension the Pequod, represent safety and what is knowable. Conversely, the sea 
represents danger and what is unknowable. This distinction, which Ishmael carries over 
into the mind, is similar to the divide between the conscious and unconscious. Ishmael’s 
“insular Tahiti” corresponds to the knowable, familiar conscious mind, while the sea 
corresponds to the unconscious, “a special region of the mind, shut off from the rest” 
(Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis 345). The sea as Ishmael describes it is 
not a perfect depiction of Freud’s unconscious. For example, Ishmael seems to equate the 
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sea with madness itself when he says that one cannot encounter it without going mad. 
Furthermore, there is the added element of divine influence, or “God’s foot upon the 
treadle of the loom” (Melville 372). However, both share that fundamental quality of 
unsettling mystery, an inner one that is responsible, perhaps more directly to Ishmael and 
more indirectly to Freud, for madness. Two of our mad characters, Ahab and Pip, are 
mad as a direct result of their traumatic experiences in the water, the physical 
manifestation of the unfathomable, terrifying mystery within every human soul. 
 
Shoreless, Indefinite as God 
 
 I return to my initial observation that it is strange that Ishmael researches whales 
and goes on whaling voyages even after his experience on the Pequod. Given the terrors 
that Pip encounters out at sea, and the dangers that all whalers acknowledge, it seems 
especially strange that Ahab, too, would ask the decapitated sperm whale to share its 
secrets.  For as terrible as the sea is, it does have some allure for Ahab and Ishmael, and 
is in some way, according to Ishmael, superior to the land. Ishmael says in “The Lee 
Shore,” 
The port would fain give succor; the port is pitiful; in the port is safety, 
comfort, hearthstone, supper, warm blankets, friends, all that’s kind to our 
mortalities. But in that gale, the port, the land, is that ship’s direst 
jeopardy; she must fly all hospitality; one touch of land, though it but 
graze the keel, would make her shudder through and through. With all her 
might she crowds all sail off shore; in so doing, fights ’gainst the very 
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winds that fain would blow her homeward; seeks all the lashed sea’s 
landlessness again; for refuge’s sake forlornly rushing into peril; her only 
friend her bitterest foe . . . But as in landlessness alone resides the highest 
truth, shoreless, indefinite as God—so, better is it to perish in that howling 
infinite, than be ingloriously dashed upon the lee, even if that were to 
safety! . . . Up from the spray of thy ocean-perishing—straight up, leaps 
thy apotheosis! (94-95) 
Ishmael talks disparagingly of the land for being “pitiful” despite its “comfort.” He 
personifies the ship, investing her with the volition of a human being. She fights against 
returning home to the land and “seeks all the lashed sea’s landlessness.” She yearns for 
the ocean because “in landlessness alone resides the highest truth, shoreless, indefinite as 
God.” Despite the presence of madness in the ocean, the sea contains some truth for 
Ishmael that the land lacks. The sea is alluring, and the land is merely “all that’s kind to 
our mortalities.” 
Barbara Glenn labels this alluring quality of the sea, simultaneously attractive and 
repulsive, as the sublime, in her insightful essay “Melville and the Sublime in Moby-
Dick.” Her primary source on the sublime is Edmund Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry 
into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, a book Melville owned (Glenn 
165). Glenn explains, 
Melville makes use of nearly all the causes of the sublime which Burke 
enumerates in the Enquiry, embodying these causes in the very examples 
Burke cites. Burke's first example of sublimity, the sea, is the world in 
which almost the entire narrative of Moby-Dick is set, and that sea is 
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sublime according to Burke's exact prescriptions: a rugged and broken 
surface; an apparent infinity in the succession of its waves; a vast 
extension, particularly in depth; and most of all, a vast disorder, terrible, 
irresistibly powerful and obscure. (167) 
The ominous uncertainty that Ishmael constantly associates with the sea corresponds with 
Burke’s definition of sublimity. Furthermore, Burke’s comparison of the sublime and the 
beautiful echoes Ishmael’s comparison of the land and the sea. According to Burke’s 
assessment, the sea corresponds to the sublime, and the land corresponds to the beautiful: 
For sublime objects are vast in their dimensions, beautiful ones are 
comparatively small; beauty should be smooth, and polished; the great, 
rugged and negligent . . . beauty should not be obscure; the great ought to 
be dark and gloomy; beauty should be light and delicate; beauty should 
not be obscure; the great ought to be solid, and even massive. (Burke 550) 
The land is “smooth” and “polished” in comparison with the “rugged and negligent” sea. 
The sea is “obscure,” “dark,” and “gloomy,” while the land is “light and delicate.” The 
land is beautiful because it is comfortable and contains “all that’s kind to our mortalities.” 
The sea, in contrast, is “shoreless, indefinite as God,” just as the sublime is “vast in [its] 
dimensions.” According to Ishmael’s description of the sea and Burke’s of the sublime, 
the sea is sublime. 
 Kant writes, conversely, that an object like “the vast ocean heaved up by storms” 
is not sublime, because it is perceivable by the senses: “nothing that can be an object of 
the sense is to be called sublime” (Kant 522). The sublime, by its definition, cannot be 
experienced by the senses. The sublime evokes the idea in a person that his senses are 
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insufficient for understanding: “[What happens is that] our imagination strives to 
progress toward infinity, while our reason demands absolute totality as a real idea, and so 
[the imagination,] our power of estimating the magnitude of things in the world of sense, 
is inadequate to that idea” (522). As he is contemplating the inferiority of his senses 
though, the person realizes his own “supersensible power” (522). Thus, the sublime is 
“the attunement that the intellect [gets] through a certain presentation that occupies 
reflective judgment” (521-523). The ability to acknowledge an inability to understand is a 
kind of knowledge, and so “sublime” describes those notions that bring that knowledge 
forward: “Sublimity is what even to be able to think proves that the mind has a power 
surpassing any standard of sense” (522). 
The sublimity of the ocean and of the white whale, which encompasses the 
uncertainty, vastness, infinity, and obscurity inherent in nature, is a reminder to Ahab and 
Ishmael of the gap between humanity and nature. In other words, it is a reminder of 
nature’s complete power over humanity and the inadequacy of our own imaginations to 
comprehend it. Conversely, the beauty of nature reassures humanity that their world is 
comprehensible and in tune with human beings: “In the presence of the sublime in nature 
the mind feels agitated, while in an aesthetic judgment about the beautiful in nature it is 
in restful contemplation” (526). The painting in the Spouter-Inn is a perfect example of 
the sublime; it forces Ishmael, who describes the painting as “enough to drive a nervous 
man distracted,” to ask several other guests what they see in it. Ishmael is obviously 
annoyed by his inability to comprehend the painting, and his curiosity is a state of 
agitation. Kant compares such an agitation with a vibration that alternates between 
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“repulsion from, and attraction to” (Kant 526). Though Ishmael is bothered by the 
painting’s incomprehensibility, it entices him. 
 
 Framed Sublimity 
 
The sublime in Moby Dick is not reducible to the sublimity of the sea or of Moby 
Dick. Moby Dick contains a framed mystery that makes its depths especially difficult to 
plumb for all involved—Ishmael, Ahab, and the reader. Both Ahab and Ishmael are 
consumed by the mystery of whales and their environment, perhaps the former more than 
the latter, but Ishmael has an addition source of the sublime with which to contend: Ahab. 
Ishmael takes on Ahab’s quest of understanding whales and the sea, but he does this, 
perhaps in part, as a means to getting at Ahab. As Ishmael’s inconstant evaluation of 
Ahab’s nightmares shows, Ahab’s interior may be just as unfathomable as the sea. John 
Wenke closely examines Ahab, his unconscious and his motives in “Ahab and ‘the 
Larger, Darker, Deeper Part.’” He says of Ishmael’s analysis of Ahab, “No inquirer can 
appropriate the secret of another’s being: nor can one transcend the chronological fact of 
one’s own exile from a putatively primal, unifying self” (Wenke 704). Ahab is 
impenetrable, and in this way, his mind is the sublime. 
Wenke distinguishes between the conscious and unconscious regions of the mind, 
where the unconscious region is the undecipherable one: “At the self’s deepest layers, 
Ishmael discovers an insuperable ignorance of the unconscious self” (704). In Ishmael’s 
metaphor, the “verdant land” corresponds to sanity, and the “appalling ocean” 
corresponds to insanity. This metaphor takes on new meaning in conversation with the 
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sublime. Just as one cannot penetrate the mysteries of the sea, Ishmael cannot penetrate 
the mysteries of the unconscious. Ahab’s unconscious meets Burke’s simplest criteria: it 
is “dark and gloomy,” “rugged and negligent,” and “vast in [its] dimensions.” 
Furthermore, beyond its impenetrable, gloomy mysteries, Ahab’s unconscious 
evokes in Ishmael the same feeling of inadequate imagination that the sea evokes in 
Ahab, which recalls Kant’s qualification that the sublime exists not in the object itself but 
in its reminder of the inadequacy of the senses. Wenke says, “Though able to affect a 
‘firm, collected front,’ Ahab still ‘in his hidden self, raved on.’ The nature of this ‘hidden 
self’ looms among Ishmael’s most vexing hermeneutical problems, for as Ishmael 
realizes, what he fathoms must be little more than a frustrating prelude to what cannot be 
fathomed” (Wenke 703). Ahab serves as a reminder to Ishmael that there exist mysteries 
that the human mind is incapable of penetrating. 
The sublime appears in several distinct guises: the whale, the sea, and Ahab’s 
unconscious. Each object possesses an inscrutable quality, one that leaves its interpreter 
at a loss for understanding. Ahab is Ishmael’s “hermeneutic” project, as Wenke puts it, 
just as the sea is Ahab’s. The reader is left then with at least three sublime objects to 
decipher: the sea, the whale, and Ahab. Ishmael is charged with the same task, and his 
interpretive eye simultaneously helps and hinders the reader’s understanding. We are 
distanced from the initial objects of interpretation, the sea and the whale, through Ahab’s 
perception and then Ishmael’s perception of Ahab’s unconscious. This framed sublimity 
makes Moby Dick particularly difficult to pin down. 
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Chapter 2 
Is Ahab, Ahab?: A Loss of Agency 
  
A Natural Fatality 
   
In Chapter 130 of Moby Dick, “The Hat,” Ahab decides to take up the watch for 
Moby Dick by ascending the mast. Before he hoists himself up, “he look[s] round upon 
his crew, sweeping from one to the other; pausing his glance long upon Daggoo, 
Queequeg, Tashtego; but shunning Fedallah; and then settling his firm relying eye upon 
the chief mate, [and says],—‘Take the rope, sir—I give it into thy hands, Starbuck’” 
(Melville 475). Ahab charges Starbuck with binding the rope so that he does not fall from 
his perch. Ishmael explains that the rope’s “fastened end on deck is always given in strict 
charge to some one man who has the special watch of it. Because in such a wilderness of 
running rigging . . . it would be but a natural fatality [emphasis added] if, unprovided 
with a constant watchman, the hoisted sailor should by some carelessness of the crew be 
cast adrift and fall all swooping to the sea” (475). After Ahab looks to each crew 
member, considering each of them (save Fedallah), he chooses to put the rope and his life 
in the hands of Starbuck: the one crew member who has challenged him. As if the reader 
is not already suspicious, Ishmael draws our attention directly to this choice: 
[T]he only strange things about [Ahab’s proceedings] seemed to be, that 
Starbuck, almost the one only man who had ever ventured to oppose him 
with anything in the slightest degree approaching to decision—one of 
those too, whose faithfulness on the look-out he had seemed to doubt 
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somewhat; it was strange, that this was the very man he should select for 
his watchman; freely giving his whole life into such an otherwise 
distrusted person’s hands. (475-476) 
If Starbuck were to fasten the rope incorrectly, Ahab would surely die, and the act would 
likely not be perceived as mutinous; Ishmael makes a point to tell us that this kind of 
accident is not uncommon, calling it a “natural fatality.” Ahab, who is always methodical 
and careful, gives Starbuck an ideal opportunity to drown him, but Ishmael does not give 
an explanation for this peculiar choice; he merely calls attention to it. 
One interpretation of this strange gesture is that Ahab sees in Starbuck a potential 
end to his suffering. On the one hand, he knows that Starbuck is not quite capable of 
committing mutiny. In Chapter 36, “The Quarter-Deck,” Ahab invites Starbuck to speak 
out against him:   
Stand up amid the general hurricane, thy one tost sapling cannot, 
Starbuck! And what is it? Reckon it. ‘Tis but to help strike a fin; no 
wondrous feat for Starbuck. What is it more? From this one poor hunt, 
then, the best lance out of all  Nantucket, surely he will not hang back, 
when every foremasthand has clutched a whetstone? Ah! constrainings 
seize thee; I see! the billow lifts thee! Speak, but speak!—Aye, aye! thy 
silence, then, that voices thee. (Aside) Something shot from my dilated 
nostrils, he has inhaled it in his lungs. Starbuck now is mine; cannot 
oppose me now, without rebellion. (146) 
Starbuck says nothing, and Ahab knows from this that Starbuck is incapable of opposing 
him. On the other hand, although he knows that Starbuck is too weak to commit mutiny, 
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he hopes that if put in charge of the rigging, Starbuck will be able to act on his mutinous 
impulses. This peculiar decision suggests that Ahab is not driven by a vengeful impulse 
alone; there exist two dueling interests that inhabit Ahab, one rational, the other 
irrational.  
In his comprehensive yet concise book Obsession, Lennard J. Davis traces 
obsession from its historical origins to its current cultural relevance. He tells us that 
obsession is usually characterized by a contest between two “selves,” where “a 
compulsive self struggles with an observing self” (Davis 31). He explains that the Latin 
words obsessio and possessio describe two ways of taking over a city during war: 
“Possideo, -ere and obsideo, -ere are two phases in the assault. If you’ve obsessed a city, 
you’ve surrounded it, but the citadel remains intact; while if you possess the city, the 
walls have been breached and you’ve conquered the citadel and its citizens” (31). The 
words “possession” and “obsession” became popular during the third and fourth centuries 
to describe two different kinds of demonic infiltration: in the former, victims are 
oblivious to the devil’s presence inside them, while in the latter, victims are aware of the 
devil’s presence and can defend themselves, because the devil has yet to claim their souls 
(31). The religious origins of these words reveal a real symptom of pathological 
obsession. Davis continues, “[O]bsession means that the person is aware of the symptoms 
and possible cause of his or her behavior. This ability to know that certain behaviors are 
not controllable, but somehow are also not coming from within one’s own desire or will, 
characterizes the disease of obsession” (31-32). This capacity to recognize the 
irrationality of one’s behavior while simultaneously being unable to control it, as 
Ishmael’s description from “The Spirit-Spout” indicates, characterizes Ahab’s 
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monomania. Ahab has lost control of his actions, not to the external influence that has 
taken his leg, but to an internal one that he struggles to identify. 
   
All the Horrors of the Half Known Life: The Origin of Ahab’s Madness 
   
 Like Ahab, Pip is confronted by two daunting, potentially sublime objects: the 
vast and terrible ocean, which I have discussed in Chapter 1, and himself. Ishmael 
mentions the second so subtly and so briefly in comparison with his extensive description 
of the sea that it is easy to overlook: “Now, in calm weather, to swim in the open ocean is 
as easy to the practised swimmer as to ride in a spring-carriage ashore. But the awful 
lonesomeness is intolerable. The intense concentration of self [emphasis added] in the 
middle of such a heartless immensity, my God! who can tell it?” (371). Ishmael proposes 
that Pip encounters something in himself that is just as responsible as his encounter with 
the ocean for his madness. As I have suggested, this “intense concentration of self” is an 
appearance of the unconscious in Pip’s trauma, and it participates in Ahab’s trauma as 
well. In both cases, the internal terrors these characters encounter resemble the 
unconscious: an unknowable portion of the mind whose influence is uncertain. 
Though Ahab is not lost at sea for an extended period of time like Pip, their initial 
traumas are similar. Both characters come close to death after an encounter with a 
sublime object, which forces them to acknowledge the frailty of their lives. Pip believes 
that Stubb will keep his word that he would not be saved a second time, and the hour he 
spends floating between ships proves enough time to contemplate his own death and 
drive him mad. Ahab undergoes a comparable period of contemplation during which he is 
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not sure if he will live or die, and he does not go mad the instant his leg is torn from his 
body; he only does so at the end of a period of uncertainty. As Ishmael explains, 
It is not probable that this monomania took its instant rise at the precise 
time of his bodily dismemberment. Then, in darting at the monster, knife 
in hand, he had but given loose to a sudden, passionate, corporal 
animosity; and when he received the stroke that tore him, he probably felt 
the agonizing bodily laceration, but nothing more. (165) 
Madness only emerges as Ahab lies in his cabin, suffering his whale-given wound: “Ahab 
and anguish lay stretched together in one hammock . . . then it was, that his body and 
gashed soul bled into one another; and so interfusing, made him mad” (165). Ahab is 
incoherent and violent, and his shipmates are forced to bind him in a “strait-jacket” (165). 
That Ahab does not go mad as soon as Moby Dick takes his leg indicates that Ahab goes 
insane only after reflecting upon his injury; the act itself was not enough to incite 
vengeful madness. This pause before madness suggests that some mental process, 
deliberation, or choice, must take place first before madness can establish itself in a mind. 
Ahab’s transformation into a  madman, like Pip’s, is reminiscent of Ishmael’s 
analogy in which one wanders from his “insular Tahiti, full of peace and joy” to 
encounter in himself “all the horrors of the half known life.” Ishmael suggests that the 
opaque and deadly ocean resembles an inner horror that one is better off avoiding. 
Although a split between a rational and irrational mind is observable in the mad Pip and 
Ahab, in Ishmael’s analogy of madness, involving the “verdant land” and “appalling 
ocean” of the mind, Ishmael suggests that this split exists in all people, and one’s 
decision whether to wander from one’s “insular Tahiti” ultimately determines whether 
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one is sane or insane. When one ventures from one’s internal island, a knowable and safe 
place, as Ahab and Pip do following their traumas, “his torn body and gashed soul [bleed] 
into one another; and so interfusing, [make] him mad.” If the bleeding together of body 
and soul, or of rational and irrational minds, leads to madness, then Ishmael is kind to 
advise his reader to stay on his island. 
The ocean of Ishmael’s analogy is physically represented in Pip’s trauma, and so 
the relationship between his trauma and the analogy is recognizable; the differing 
landscapes in which Pip finds himself directly correlate to those landscapes in Ishmael’s 
analogy (when Pip is on board the Pequod, he is sane, but as soon as he ventures out into 
the ocean, he becomes insane). Though Ahab’s trauma does not correlate so exactly, the 
oceanic conditions mirror Ahab’s mental state as he is locked in his cabin, and thus also 
visually depict the analogy: “In a strait-jacket, he swung to the mad rockings of the gales. 
And, when running into more sufferable latitudes, the ship, with mild stun’sails spread, 
floated across the tranquil tropics, and, to all appearances, the old man’s delirium seemed 
left behind him with the Cape Horn swells” (165). As Ahab descends into madness, the 
ship rocks violently in the “howling Patagonian Cape.” As he goes mad, “the mad 
rockings of the gales” swing him back and forth in his hammock and strait-jacket. 
Finally, when the ship encounters calm waters, Ahab seemingly regains his sanity. By all 
appearances, he returns to his former self. 
Ishmael explains that this is not the case: “[H]e came forth from his dark den into 
the blessed light and air; even then, when he bore that firm, collected front . . . and issued 
his calm orders once again; and his mates thanked God the direful madness was gone; 
even then Ahab, in his hidden self, raved on” (165). Though Ahab seems once again sane 
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to his crew, his composure only masks his lingering insanity: “Human madness is 
oftentimes a cunning and most feline thing. When you think it fled, it may have but 
become transfigured into some still subtler form” (165). With Ahab’s return to pseudo-
normalcy, the realization of his irrational, unconscious self is complete. Ishmael describes 
this simultaneous existence of intellect and madness, the former now a tool of the latter: 
“But, as in this narrow-flowing monomania, not one jot of Ahab’s broad madness had 
been left behind; so in that broad madness, not one jot of his great natural intellect had 
perished. That before living agent, now became the living instrument” (165). Ahab is the 
same “compulsive self struggl[ing] with an observing self” that Davis describes, because 
although his acumen is intact, Ahab has the capacity to recognize, but not end, his 
obsession. In religious terms of the 15
th
 and 16
th
 centuries, Ahab is aware of his own 
demon. It becomes clearer then why Ahab, capable of being both rational and irrational 
simultaneously, would put Starbuck, his only challenger, in charge of his life. He hopes 
Starbuck can do what he cannot: put an end to his obsession. 
 
 
Nameless, Inscrutable, Unearthly 
  
 In “The Symphony,” two chapters after Ahab puts his life in the hands of 
Starbuck, Ahab confides in Starbuck and explicitly states that he fears he does not govern 
his own actions: 
What is it, what nameless, inscrutable, unearthly thing is it; what 
cozening, hidden lord and master, and cruel, remorseless emperor 
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commands me; that against all natural lovings and longing, I so keep 
pushing, and crowding, and jamming myself on all the time; recklessly 
making me ready to do what in my own proper, natural heart, I durst not 
so much as dare? Is Ahab, Ahab? Is it I, God, or who, that lifts this arm? 
But if the great sun move not of himself; but is as an errand-boy in 
heaven; nor one single star can revolve, but by some invisible power; how 
then can this one small heart beat; this one small brain think thoughts; 
unless God does that beating, does that thinking, does that living, and not 
I? By heaven, man, we are turned round and round in this world, like 
yonder windlass, and Fate is the handspike. And all that time, lo! that 
smiling sky, and this unsounded sea! Look! see yon Albicore! who put it 
into him to chase and fang that flying-fish? Where do murderers go, man? 
Who’s to doom, when the judge himself is dragged to the bar? But it is a 
mild, mild wind, and a mild looking sky; and the air smells now, as if it 
blew from a far-away meadow; they have been making hay somewhere 
under the slopes of the Andes, Starbuck, and the mowers are sleeping 
among the new-mown hay. Sleeping? Aye, toil we how we may, we all 
sleep at last on the field. Sleep? Aye, and rust amid greenness; as last 
year’s scythes flung down, and left in the half-cut swathes—Starbuck? 
(481) 
In this rare moment of lucidity, Ahab admits to feeling as though his actions are not his 
own. He distinguishes between the “lovings and longings” of his “natural heart” and 
those things a “hidden lord and master, and cruel remorseless emperor” orders him to do. 
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The query “Is Ahab, Ahab?” makes explicit his loss of agency. He finds the origin of his 
actions not in himself but in some “nameless, inscrutable, unearthly thing,” words which 
exactly describe the mysterious sublime of the internal and external influences Pip 
encounters at sea. 
 Aside from this explicit reference to an ulterior controlling principal, there exist 
numerous more subtle hints at the presence of Ahab’s unconscious. For instance, when 
Ishmael compares Ahab’s living leg and dead leg, he distinguishes between a knowable 
and rational part of the mind, the conscious, and an unknowable and irrational part of the 
mind, the unconscious. In Chapter 51, “The Spirit-Spout,” the ship pursues a jet of water 
that appears at the boat’s bow, which the crew presumes came from Moby Dick: 
The strange, upheaving, lifting tendency of the taffrail breeze filling the 
hollows of so many sails, made the buoyant, hovering deck to feel like air 
beneath the feet; while still she rushed along, as if two antagonistic 
influences were struggling in her [emphasis added]—one to mount 
directly to heaven, the other to drive yawingly to some horizontal goal. 
And had you watched Ahab’s face that night, you would have thought that 
within him two different things were warring. While his one live leg made 
lively echoes along the deck, every stroke of his dead limb sounded like a 
coffin-tap. On life and death this man walked. (209) 
Ishmael establishes a dichotomy here, where Ahab’s living leg and his whale-bone leg 
represent two forces, both internal, wrenching him in opposite directions, just as his ship 
is thrown both horizontally and skyward by the sea. He sees this internal conflict between 
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selves in the alternating thumps of the living and dead leg: one leg makes “lively echoes,” 
and the other “dead limb” makes a sound reminiscent of a “coffin-tap.”  
 Ahab’s peg-leg is the physical manifestation of his trauma, and it marks an 
exchange that takes place between Ahab and an external influence. Presumably, Moby 
Dick consumed Ahab’s leg, thus making Ahab a part of him. Ahab, in turn, replaced his 
absent leg with a peg-leg made from the jawbone of a whale. Ahab has thus wandered 
from his island in two senses: a physical one, where the external is now a part of him, and 
a psychological one, where the ominous ocean of Ishmael’s analogy has flooded Ahab’s 
rational island: “Ahab and anguish lay stretched together in one hammock . . . then it was, 
that his body and gashed soul bled into one another; and so interfusing, made him mad.” 
Though Ahab’s unconscious becomes more pronounced after his trauma, Ahab is 
adept at concealing its influence. He is an accomplished actor. Ishmael is constantly 
reminding us of the “infinity of firmest fortitude, a determinate, unsurrenderable 
willfulness” of Ahab’s stare. However, Ahab’s dreams are another manifestation of his 
unconscious, showing that Ahab is not the master of his own self and that, while he is 
fully aware of his monomania, he cannot control it. Ishmael explains that the collected 
Ahab his crew sees during the day, the one who retires to his cabin each night, is not the 
Ahab who emerges in the middle of the night, tormented by nightmares: 
[W]hen this hell in himself yawned beneath him, a wild cry would be 
heard through the ship; and with glaring eyes Ahab would burst from his 
state room, as though escaping from a bed that was on fire . . . at such 
times, crazy Ahab, the scheming, unappeasedly steadfast hunter of the 
white whale; this Ahab that had gone to his hammock, was not the agent 
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that so caused him to burst from it in horror again. The latter was the 
eternal, living principle or soul in him; and in sleep, being for the time 
dissociated from the characterizing mind, which at other times employed it 
for its outer vehicle or agent, it spontaneously sought escape from the 
scorching contiguity of the frantic thing, of which, for the time, it was no 
longer an integral. But as the mind does not exist unless leagued with the 
soul, therefore it must have been that, in Ahab’s case, yielding up all his 
thoughts and fancies to his one supreme purpose; that purpose, by its own 
sheer inveteracy of will, forced itself against gods and devils into a kind of 
self-assumed, independent being of its own. (180-181) 
The Ahab that emerges at night is the marionettist, the demon that simultaneously 
depends upon and manipulates Ahab’s “characterizing mind” for its own ends. The 
external Ahab, which corresponds to the conscious, is a mere “vehicle” for the “self-
assumed, independent” force that works the controls from within. Sleep, Ishmael says, is 
the sole opportunity for the second self to appear, because during sleep, Ahab’s 
intellectual defenses are down; his “exhausting and intolerable vivid dreams of the night” 
take up again “his own intense thoughts through the day” and “carr[y] them on amid 
clashing of phrensies, and [whirl] them round and round in his blazing brain, till the very 
throbbing of his life-spot [becomes] insufferable anguish” (180). At night, the rational 
mask that appears after Ahab’s several months of lunacy is torn away to reveal the 
pervading madness underneath. Ishmael’s interpretation of Ahab’s night terrors is in 
accordance with Freudian theory, which contends that unconscious desires emerge in 
dreams. Ahab’s unconscious will asserts itself during sleep, and Ahab loses the façade of 
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control that he maintains during waking life. The unconscious then becomes not only the 
force driving Ahab to pursue the white whale, but one that robs Ahab’s “characterizing 
mind” of sovereignty. 
Apart from these instances, the Pequod’s crew and the reader most often see a 
critically thinking, calmer Ahab: the rational disguise. This is what I mean by calling 
Ahab an actor: he maintains the mental alacrity to pursue his insane ambition by sane 
means. He is familiar enough with social conventions, human nature, and the whaling 
industry to manipulate his surroundings to suit the needs of the invading influence within: 
“Ahab plainly saw that he must still in a good degree continue true to the natural, 
nominal purpose of the Pequod’s voyage; observe all customary usages; and not only 
that, but force himself to evince all his well known passionate interest in the general 
pursuit of his profession” (191-192). He is aware of the inconstancy of his crew, and of 
Starbuck’s growing frustration, and knows that if he is not able to successfully distract 
his men and dissuade Starbuck, his quest will fail. In doing so, he acknowledges also the 
insanity of his own quest, but he still cannot stop himself. All the while, the intellectual 
part of Ahab suffers the horror of losing its agency; it is a mere tool. In this way, Ahab 
exemplifies the description Davis provides of the typical obsessive, where the obsessed 
person acts according to unknown desires and experiences a paralysis of will. 
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Chapter 3 
The Function of the Other in Ahab’s Obsession 
 
The Whiteness of the Objet Petit A 
 
Ahab first speaks about the whale in Chapter 36, “The Quarter Deck,” after 
Starbuck speaks out for the first time against Ahab: “‘Vengeance on a dumb brute!’ cried 
Starbuck, ‘that simply smote thee from blindest instinct! Madness! To be enraged with a 
dumb thing, Captain Ahab, seems blasphemous’” (145). Starbuck asserts that seeking 
revenge on a whale is foolish, because the “dumb brute” acted only out of “blind 
instinct.” His wording suggests that Ahab thinks otherwise, that the whale decided to 
harm Ahab out of malice rather than instinct. Ahab’s response to Starbuck corroborates 
this interpretation: 
‘Hark ye yet again,—the little lower layer. All visible objects, man, are but 
as pasteboard masks. But in each event—in the living act, the undoubted 
deed—there, some unknown but still reasoning thing puts forth the 
mouldings of its features from behind the unreasoning mask. If man will 
strike, strike through the mask! How can the prisoner reach outside except 
by thrusting through the wall? To me, the white whale is that wall, shoved 
near to me. Sometimes I think there’s naught beyond. But ‘tis enough. He 
tasks me; he heaps me; I see in him outrageous strength, with an 
inscrutable malice sinewing it. That inscrutable thing is chiefly what I 
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hate; and be the white whale agent, or be the white whale principal, I 
wreak that hate upon him. (145) 
Ahab explains that while the whale may seem insignificant, a “pasteboard mask,” there is 
necessarily a presence behind the mask, an “inscrutable malice” that gives the whale 
strength. Ahab recommends one “strike through the mask,” as a prisoner would break 
through the wall of his prison to escape. He does not believe the whale acts of its own 
will, whether by instinct or malicious intent: he believes that the whale is an instrument 
for an unseen, powerful force. If Ahab kills the whale, he trusts that he will injure that 
force. Ahab admits here that he knows the whale might not ultimately responsible for his 
injury. 
 For Ahab, the whale takes on greater significance than a “dumb brute . . . that 
simply smote him from blindest instinct” should. Ishmael explains, 
Small reason was there to doubt, then, that ever since that almost fatal 
encounter, Ahab had cherished a wild vindictiveness against the whale, all 
the more fell for that in his frantic morbidness he at last came to identify 
with him, not only all his bodily woes, but all his intellectual and spiritual 
exasperations [emphasis added]. The White Whale swam before him as 
the monomaniac incarnation of all those malicious agencies which some 
deep men feel eating in them, till they are left living on with half a heart 
and half a lung . . . All that most maddens and torments; all that stirs up 
the lees of things; all truth with malice in it; all that cracks the sinews and 
cakes the brain; all the subtle demonisms of life and thought; all evil, to 
crazy Ahab, were visibly personified, and made practically assailable in 
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Moby Dick. He piled upon the whale’s white hump the sum of all the 
general rage and hate felt by his whole race from Adam down [emphasis 
added]; and then, as if his chest has been a mortar, he burst his hot heart’s 
shell upon it. (164-165) 
In Moby Dick, Ahab finds a home for the sublime mystery that terrifies him; he locates a 
threat to humanity in the whale, which is, unlike the threat it represents, destroyable. The 
whale’s mystery stands in for the sea’s mystery, and thus the whale in Lacanian terms 
becomes the objet petit a. In his essay “Filling the Void,” Dennis Williams applies 
psychoanalytic theory to Moby Dick as a way to “explore the importance of the void,” 
which Williams identifies as a fundamental element in both Moby Dick and Lacanian 
theory. He labels Moby Dick as the objet petit a, or the “object of desire, simultaneously 
marking, substituting for, and occulting the place of lack or void” (Williams 77). The 
whale, says Williams, “beyond the obvious fact of the revenge motif, continually 
emphasized throughout the novel . . . exerts a wholly disproportionate fascination for 
Ahab” (73). He thus finds Moby Dick “a phantasmatic object, a kind of fetish object at 
the center of Ahab’s libidinal economy”: the objet petit a (73). 
The appearance of an objet petit a indicates that a reaction formation has taken 
place, a displacement of undesirable fears of the incomprehensible sublime onto 
something comprehensive: the whale. Ishmael describes the legendary whiteness of 
Moby Dick: 
Aside from those more obvious considerations touching Moby Dick, 
which could not but occasionally awaken in any man’s soul some alarm, 
there was another thought, or rather vague, nameless horror concerning 
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him, which at times by its intensity completely overpowered all the rest; 
and yet so mystical and well nigh ineffable was it, that I almost despair of 
putting it in a comprehensible form. It was the whiteness of the whale that 
above all things appalled me. (168) 
In “The Whiteness of the Whale,” Ishmael struggles to explain the significance of the 
whiteness even as he calls our attention to it: “But how can I hope to explain myself here; 
and yet, in some dim, random way, explain myself I must, else all these chapters might be 
naught” (168). Ishmael explores the semantic associations of white with “new-fallen 
snow,” “the White Tower of London,” and the “White Mountains of New Hampshire” 
(172), explaining that these appearances of white differ from Moby Dick, because his 
whiteness does not signify holiness or newness, but absence: “Or is it, that as in essence 
whiteness is not so much a color as the visible absence of color, and at the same time the 
concrete of all colors; is it for these reasons that there is such a dumb blankness, full of 
meaning, in a wide landscape of snows—a colorless, all-color of atheism from which we 
shrink?” (175). 
I have discussed a similar absence of meaning with reference to the sea. This 
absence, and Ahab and Ishmael’s simultaneous attraction to and repulsion from it, 
implicates the whale as another appearance of the sublime in Moby Dick. The gap 
between these two characters and the sea, and now between them and the whale, can be 
considered in Lacanian terms. White whale as sublime object becomes white whale as 
Lacan’s objet petit a. Lacan tells us that the subject is compelled to penetrate the Other, 
whom the subject perceives as containing elusive knowledge. This elusive knowledge, 
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the mystery of the Other, drives him to invest inordinate energy into an object, as Ahab 
does the whale—to become obsessed with it.  
The secret the subject seeks to learn from the Other and the objet petit a are the 
same. Thus, in conversation with Moby Dick, it becomes difficult to determine whether 
the whale is the objet petit a or the mystery itself, assuming that these are mutually 
exclusive terms. Does the whale evoke in Ahab the infuriatingly unquenchable mystery 
that drives him, or is the whale Ahab’s futile answer to a mystery previously evoked 
elsewhere? I suggest the latter. 
The whale with his whiteness is certainly a sublime object, presenting its own 
self-contained mystery to Ahab, Ishmael, and the reader. Its whiteness is evidence of this 
sublimity: it is immense and unknowable. However, its sublimity lies not in its apparent 
meaninglessness (for something meaningless is not necessarily also sublime), but in its 
ability to remind one of the occasional failure of the human imagination to comprehend. 
This recalls Kant’s qualification that “nothing that can be an object of the sense is to be 
called sublime (Kant 522). By Kant’s definition, the whale would not be sublime, but its 
ability to evoke a feeling of inadequacy would be: “[What happens is that] our 
imagination strives to progress toward infinity, while our reason demands absolute 
totality as a real idea, and so [the imagination,] our power of estimating the magnitude of 
things in the world of sense, is inadequate to that idea” (522). Williams’ discussion of the 
apparent meaninglessness of the whale’s whiteness echoes Kant’s definition of sublimity: 
[W]e should avoid a precipitate reading that forces a “choice” between 
white as “meaningful” and white as “meaningless.” It is precisely the 
ambiguity itself generated by these conflicting readings—ambiguity 
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“itself”—that, from one perspective, constitutes the very “meaning” of 
“whiteness.” And the phrase “the meaning of meaninglessness” signals 
precisely the aporia of self-cancelling logical deadlock involved here: if all 
things are evacuated of meaning, there still remains, as a kind of shadow 
or negative image, the meaning of that evacuation, the meaning of the 
assertion of meaninglessness. The psychoanalytic function of the “void” 
evokes precisely this tension and oscillation: any “meaning” or semantic 
depth necessarily supervenes upon the “meaninglessness,” the void, of the 
originary losses that constitute the subject. (Williams 75) 
The ambiguity one confronts in not being able to determine whether Moby Dick is 
meaningful or meaningless, I see as akin to the struggle of one faced with the sublime. 
The problem in each case is not the immensity of nothingness itself, but the feelings, 
those of uncertainty and smallness, that it evokes in a participant. This subtle distinction 
between meaninglessness and the void is parallel to the distinction between the whale 
itself as sublime object and the ambiguity of the whale as sublime object; the first of each 
pair connotes comprehensibility, and the second connotes hopeless obscurity. 
Indeterminacy, aroused in Ishmael by the whale and in all others by the sublime, is 
unsettling, and while it is present in the latter, it is absent in the former. 
Williams describes Ishmael’s account of Moby Dick’s whiteness as validation of 
“the Lacanian psychoanalytic emphases on the void and absence” (74). He continues, 
“the whiteness of the whale directly symbolizes nothingness, the emptying or evacuation 
of nature; the meaning of the whale is, in essence, meaninglessness—and these 
ontological pronouncements on the ultimate meaning of reality provide a kind of 
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philosophical basis, then, for understanding the psychoanalytic operation of the void” 
(74-75). The “nameless horror concerning” Moby Dick that Ishmael attributes to his 
whiteness is the absent-signifier, or what I have just discussed in terms of the sublime and 
the ambiguous. The whale itself is the present-signified, or as Lacanian critic Slavoj 
Žižek puts it in his book The Sublime Object of Ideology, an “objectification of the void” 
(Žižek 95). The distinction, then, between objet petit a and the mystery it embodies, in 
this case between the whale and its whiteness, becomes clearer. Ahab makes Moby Dick, 
however unwillingly, his objet petit a in a fervent, if unconscious, effort to simplify an 
immense and intimidating ambiguity, the void, which is  present in all things. The whale 
happens to communicate this same ambiguity, making it an ideal obsessive object. 
 
 The Case of the Rat Man 
    
 Ahab’s obsession with Moby Dick coincides with a symbolic and literal 
castration, which Lacan tells us leads to a loss of jouissance and a cascade of problematic 
desires. When a subject loses jouissance, he perceives this loss as the result of the Other’s 
influence, sometimes thinking that the Other harbors some secret that, if revealed to the 
subject, would give way to jouissance. In the interest of refining our understanding of 
jouissance, castration, the objet petit a and the Other in relation to obsession, I turn 
momentarily to a case study that includes discussion of these terms: Freud’s account of 
the Rat Man. Compared to Freud’s interpretation of obsession, particularly with regards 
to jouissance, there is a noticeable absence of sexuality from my definition, which is 
informed more by Lacanian theory than Freudian. However, while the sexual themes in 
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Freud’s account of the Rat Man deviate from my Lacan-informed account of these terms, 
I believe it will be useful to include Freud’s account as an example of the function of 
jouissance, especially before relating this term to Moby Dick. I will first examine the Rat 
Man’s castration, and then relate Freud’s interpretation of his experience to a Lacanian 
interpretation of Ahab’s. 
“Obsessional ideas,” says Freud, “as is well known, have an appearance of being 
either without motive or without meaning, just as dreams have” (Freud 186). Such was 
the case with the Rat Man, who sought treatment from Freud, complaining of persistent 
fears that some ill would befall either his father or his lady. In addition to these fears, the 
Rat Man experienced “compulsive impulses” and unfounded “prohibitions” (158). None 
of these fears, prohibitions, and impulses appear immediately logical. The Rat Man 
reluctantly relates to Freud the story that would give him his moniker: he has a 
reoccurring fear that a form of torture, first introduced to him by a fellow army officer, 
would be carried out on his father and love-interest. At this point in his story, the patient 
becomes very uncomfortable, and it is difficult for him to relate to Freud exactly what the 
punishment entails. Freud insists that he must know what the punishment is, and so the 
patient tries, with great difficulty, to explain: “‘. . . the criminal was tied up . . .’—he 
expressed himself so indistinctly that I could not immediately guess in what position—
‘and a pot was turned upside down on his buttocks . . . some rats were put into it . . . and 
they . . .’—he had got up, and was showing every sign of horror and resistance—‘bored 
their way in . . .’—Into his anus, I helped him out” (166). The Rat Man is quick to clarify 
that in his vision of his father, his love-interest, and this torture, he is not overseeing the 
events: he is merely a remote observer, and these thoughts are “foreign and repugnant” to 
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him (167). Freud observes behavior that contradicts this claim: “At all the more important 
moments while he was telling his story his face took on a very strange, composite 
expression. I could only interpret it as one of horror at pleasure of his own of which he 
himself was unaware” (166-167). 
The patient’s motives for obsessing over the rat torture, and imagining it done to 
his father and lady, are initially unclear. We are left with many questions. Why does the 
young man specifically imagine his father and lady? Do the rats have any significance 
beyond the torture itself? The motivation behind the patient’s obsessional thoughts, for 
Freud, concerns “a former wish which was now repressed” (180). A wish, says Freud, is 
the truth within every obsessional fear, as it is the truth within every dream. The 
obsession, then, conceals, like a dream, wishes that the obsessive deems unacceptable or 
repulsive. The flicker of pleasure Freud notices on the patient’s face as he recalls the 
“repugnant” thought is an indicator of this, revealing conflicting feelings towards his 
father and his lady. The purpose of the Rat Man’s obsession becomes clearer: it is an 
extreme reaction that is supposed to reverse an unacknowledged ill wish. 
The patient, predictably, rejects the idea that he would ever wish such ill on his 
father. Freud asserts that obsessions concerning the well-being of others, in their 
extremity, arise in response to concealed yet equally strong contrary wishes. The 
obsessive quarantines a disagreeable thought, caging it within the obsession. In this way 
he controls the thought, thereby controlling his own impulses and himself. For what the 
obsessive fears most is a lack of control. Psychoanalyst Collete Soler, during a lecture for 
the annual “Seminar of the Freudian Field” described the obsessive in this way: 
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Let me provide an example of an obsessive subject . . . This particular man 
has a lover and what does he do? He calculates the precise moment at 
which he will make love to her and sees to it that another woman phones 
him at that exact time. He makes love with one woman and talks to the 
other on the phone, very calmly and collectedly at the same time. The 
essential point is not to stop making love while he is answering the phone. 
What is he doing? He is trying to prove to himself that there is no object 
capable of making him vanish. It is a strategy of mastery. It is as if he 
were trying to demonstrate that he is the master of his own desire . . . He 
tries to be the master of his desire, but also to always be thinking. (Soler 
270). 
The use of constant thinking as a means of distraction call to mind the Rat Man’s strategy 
for warding off unwanted thoughts. When images of the rat torture being performed on 
his father and his love-interest enter the Rat Man’s head uninvited, he responds with “his 
usual formulas,” one of which is “a ‘but’ accompanied by a gesture of repudiation, and 
the phrase ‘whatever are you thinking of?” (Freud 167). For a moment, the Rat Man loses 
control of his own thoughts, and to regain control, he counters these initial thoughts with 
more thinking as if to remind himself that he is the primary authority of his own mind. 
Just as the lover in Soler’s example uses thinking to distract himself from his own sexual 
fulfillment, so too does the Rat Man use thinking to counteract his own disagreeable 
instincts. In both cases, it is sexuality, or more specifically an intense desire for sexual 
fulfillment (jouissance), from which the obsessive consistently seeks distraction. As 
Freud tells us, a disproportionate attraction to jouissance characterizes the obsessive 
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(Soler 252). This attraction threatens the obsessive’s otherwise highly-controlled self and 
surroundings. 
The “incompatible idea” that the obsessive wards off is always linked with 
sexuality, in Freud’s view. According to Soler, “Sexuality itself is divided by Freud into 
two component parts. There is the “incompatible idea” or “representation” of sexuality 
which Lacan identifies with the signifier. But there is also affect,  the “quantum of affect” 
or sexual excitation itself. Affect is not an idea: It is something actual in the body” (251). 
This “something actual” is jouissance. Lacan defines two forms of neurosis, obsession 
and hysteria, by their relationship to jouissance. While both the obsessive and the 
hysteric respond to jouissance abnormally, their abnormal reactions are opposite. The 
obsessive has “too much primal pleasure,” and this is the source of his obsession (Soler 
252). In contrast, the hysteric maintains a distaste for sexuality. Put simply, jouissance 
attracts the obsessive and repels the hysteric. Soler makes an important distinction here: 
an attraction is not necessarily a fondness. While the obsessive is drawn to jouissance, the 
loss of control he experiences frightens him. His obsession serves as a defense against his 
attraction. 
Freud sees the persistent thought of the rat torture as representing a struggle for 
the patient between his father and his lady. In this scenario, the father is an obstacle for 
the patient’s sexual satisfaction—for jouissance: “The story of the rat punishment, as was 
shown by the patient’s own account of the matter and by his facial expression as he 
repeated the story to me, had fanned into a flame all his prematurely suppressed impulses 
of cruelty, egoistic and sexual alike” (Freud 215). Freud postulates that the patient’s 
infantile experiences fuel the hatred for his father that his obsessions conceal. 
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Specifically, he poses to the patient the possibility that his father interrupted him 
masturbating in his youth: 
I ventured to put forward a construction to the effect that when he was a 
child of under six he had been guilty of some sexual misdemeanor 
connected with masturbation and had been soundly castigated by his 
father. This punishment, according to my hypothesis, has, it was true, put 
an end to his masturbating, but on the other hand it had left behind it an 
ineradicable grudge against his father and had established him for all time 
as an interferer with the patient’s sexual enjoyment. (205) 
The patient confirms Freud’s hypothesis, recalling an incident from his childhood in 
which his father beat him for doing “something naughty” (205). If the father represents 
for the Rat Man a “primary defensive struggle,” in which he opposes his sexual 
fulfillment, then it follows that the reoccurring thought that the father should experience 
the rat torture is not a fear but a desire (224). The thought that inevitably follows it wards 
it off, but it is too late: the repulsive thought has already been expressed. As Freud states, 
“In time the thing which is meant to be warded off invariably finds its way into the very 
means which is being used for warding it off” (225). 
The Rat Man’s obsession with the rat torture remains at the center of his treatment 
with Freud, but his obsessions extend far beyond this one thought. He is plagued by 
numerous thoughts of harm coming to his father. For each of these thoughts, Freud finds 
a link to the patient’s sexual pleasure, or more specifically, a denial of it. Freud sees the 
father as a recurrent obstruction in the way of the Rat Man’s sexual fulfillment, starting 
with the initial traumatic incident surrounding masturbation, and following the Rat Man 
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throughout his young life. Even when he is a young man, his father continually prevents 
sexual gratification: “Moreover, his father . . . had directly opposed what later became 
our patient’s dominating passion. He had noticed that his son was always in the lady’s 
company, and had advised him to keep away from her, saying that it was imprudent of 
him and that he would only make a fool of himself” (201). The patient attains jouissance 
only after his father’s death, further confirming, for the patient, that his father was the 
single preventative force keeping him from jouissance all along. Freud says, “Several 
years after his father’s death, the first time he experienced the pleasurable sensations of 
copulation, an idea sprang into his mind: ‘This is glorious! One might murder one’s 
father for this!’ This was at once an echo and an elucidation of the obsessional ideas of 
his childhood” (201). The notion that murdering one’s father will bring sexual 
satisfaction makes sense only within the confines of Freud’s theory in which the father is 
directly responsible for the prohibition of jouissance. 
A question remains: why does the patient imagine the torture being done to his 
lady? This is not the first instance of an obsessional thought centering on his love-
interest. Earlier, during a visit from the lady at his summer home, the Rat Man was 
plagued by an obsessional need to protect her. On the day she was to leave, he kicked a 
stone while walking in the road, and it occurred to him that his lady would be riding in 
her carriage several hours later and might come to some harm if the carriage struck the 
stone. However, once he had moved the stone, he was compelled to put it in its original 
place (189-190). This series of compulsions seems, at first, to be founded on an irrational 
fear, not on logic. On the surface, it seems as though a combination of love and fear 
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impels the first compulsion, and rationality impels the second. Freud, though, sees the 
second action not as one of rationality, but as one of hate: 
A battle between love and hate was raging in the lover’s breast, and the 
object of both these feelings was one in the same person. The battle was 
represented in a plastic form by his compulsive symbolic act of removing 
the stone from the road along which she was to drive, and then undoing 
his deed of love by replacing the stone where it had lain, so that her 
carriage might come to grief against it and she herself be hurt. (191) 
Freud observes that compulsive acts in the obsessive individual often occur in “two 
successive stages,” where the second defuses the first (192). 
In the patient’s mind, both his father and his lady are equally responsible for his 
inner conflict. Without one force, the other prevails, and the conflict is resolved. As 
Freud says, “The conflicts of feeling in our patient which we have here enumerated 
separately were not independent of each other, but were bound together in pairs. His 
hatred of his lady was inevitably coupled with his attachment to his father, and inversely 
his hatred of his father with his attachment to his lady” (238). Jouissance lies at the heart 
of the obsessional thoughts concerning the lady as well as the father, for who, in the 
patient’s mind, is responsible for the patient’s longing for sexual desire if not the one he 
desires? The patient tries to satisfy the wishes of his father, the wishes of his lady, and his 
own desire simultaneously. From this insurmountable task, anxiety and paralysis result. 
As Freud says, “If an intense love is opposed by an almost equally powerful hatred, and 
is at the same time inseparably bound up with it, the immediate consequence is certain to 
be a partial paralysis of the will and an incapacity for coming to a decision upon any of 
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those actions for which love ought to provide the motive power” (241). The patient 
cannot reconcile these conflicting interests, and his obsession develops as a defense 
against the loss of his agency over his own desire. The patient, a true obsessive, denies 
his own attraction to jouissance just as his father prescribed in his youth. He cannot 
dispel the attraction entirely, though, and from this failure arises the imagined conflict 
between father and lady. 
 
Comparing the Rat Man and Ahab: Who is the Other? 
    
 From what we know of the Rat Man’s story, he does not experience the sublime; 
thus, obsession does not necessarily develop out of sublimity. However, the Rat Man, 
according to Freud, does experience a loss of pleasure, a castration which removes his 
agency: this experience, I argue, links the Rat Man and Ahab as obsessives. Both men 
develop a pathological need for control out of an initial instance of trauma. The link 
between the Rat Man’s father and love-interest is initially uncertain, and Freud only 
discovers this link after uncovering a repressed memory: an original trauma. The Rat 
Man holds his father responsible for his loss of pleasure, and so his father is the Other. 
In Ahab’s case, the Other should similarly be that thing that denies pleasure. I 
have suggested that the Other can harbor some secret from the subject; this is how it robs 
him of jouissance. According to Žižek, the secret the Other keeps from the subject 
becomes the objet petit a, that object with which the subject becomes enamored: “The 
fascinating ‘secret’ . . . is precisely the Lacanian objet petit a, the chimerical object of 
fantasy, the object causing our desire and at the same time—this is its paradox—posed 
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retroactively by this desire; in ‘going through the fantasy’ we experience how this 
fantasy-object (the ‘secret’) only materializes the void of our desire” (Žižek 65). 
 A preliminary examination might suggest that the whale is the Other for two 
reasons. First, the whale has taken Ahab’s leg, and thus robbed him of independence, 
authority, and pleasure. Second, Ahab sees in the whale a secret to be discovered, as 
evinced by his monologue in “The Sphynx.” However, I argue that while the whale is an 
objet petit a, he is not the Other; the Other is an ambiguous entity that hovers ominously 
throughout Moby Dick but never materializes outside of Ahab’s imagination. Though 
Ahab locates the source of his anxiety in Moby Dick, and Moby Dick becomes the objet 
petit a, the Other is, by Ahab’s own admission, not the whale itself but is the whale’s 
manipulator: “All visible objects, man, are but as pasteboard masks. But in each event—
in the living act, the undoubted deed—there, some unknown but still reasoning thing puts 
forth the mouldings of its features from behind the unreasoning mask.” If the Rat Man’s 
father prevents him from fulfilling his desire, then who keeps Ahab from fulfilling his? 
Who is Ahab’s Other?  
  
Ahab’s Absent Leg 
  
To answer this question, I will examine Ahab’s castration in the hopes of tracing 
it back to his castrator. Williams sees the moment when Moby Dick wrenches Ahab’s leg 
from his body as the initial trauma that corresponds to a loss of jouissance: “From a 
Lacanian perspective, this perhaps somewhat too literal gesture of castration signals the 
loss of primordial jouissance, the initial trauma, loss, or original ‘cut’ that then 
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precipitates the entire canopy of desires, defenses, and compensations that will mark the 
lifelong attempt to ‘fill’ this gap, to assuage this moment of initial trauma” (Williams 73). 
The loss of his leg plagues Ahab, robbing him of pleasure in a variety of ways. Moby 
Dick cripples Ahab by taking his leg, leaving him with a metaphorical and practically 
open wound, one which causes him continual trouble. Ahab’s prosthetic, for instance, 
nearly actually castrates him: 
For it had not been very long prior to the Pequod’s sailing from 
Nantucket, that he had been found one night lying prone upon the ground, 
and insensible; by some unknown, and seemingly inexplicable, 
unimaginable casualty, his ivory limb having been so violently displaced, 
that it had stake-wise smitten, and all but pierced his groin; nor was it 
without extreme difficulty that the agonizing wound was entirely cured. 
(Melville 413) 
Even to maintain his balance, Ahab relies on a circular “pivot-hole” in the quarter-deck in 
which he props the leg. 
In addition to these physical inconveniences associated with his missing leg, 
Moby Dick has castrated Ahab in a more significant, psychological way. This castration 
and its implications drive Ahab to hunt the white whale. The stolen leg results in a loss of 
agency and authority, and Ahab aims to reclaim these by killing Moby Dick. As the 
whale took Ahab’s leg, he also took his independence: Ahab must now depend upon his 
unreliable peg-leg and his pivot-hole. His reclusive behavior and appearance reflect a 
broken man, and while he is steadfast, he is weakened in the eyes of his crew. Because 
Ahab is confined to his cabin due to his weakened state, the crew, Ishmael, and readers 
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first glimpse him twenty-eight chapters and several days into the voyage. Ishmael tells us, 
“He looked like a man cut away from the stake, when the fire has overrunningly wasted 
all the limbs without consuming them, or taking away one particle from their compacted 
aged robustness” (108). Along with agency goes authority. In “Queen Mab,” Stubb 
recalls a dream to Flask: 
You know the old man’s ivory leg, well I dreamed he kicked me with it; 
and when I tried to kick back, upon my soul, my little man, I kicked my 
leg right off! And then, presto! Ahab seemed a pyramid, and I, like a 
blazing fool, kept kicking at it. But what was still more curious, Flask—
you know how curious all dreams are—through all this rage that I was in I 
somehow seemed to be thinking to myself that, after all, it was not much 
of an insult, that kick from Ahab. ‘Why,’ thinks I, ‘what’s the row? It’s 
not a real leg, only a false one.’ And there’s a mighty difference between a 
living thump and a dead thump. That’s what makes a blow from the hand, 
Flask, fifty times more savage to bear than a blow from the cane. The 
living member—that makes the living insult, my little man. (114) 
The ivory leg poses no threat to Stubb, and its kick does not motivate him as one from a 
real leg would. It is rare for Ahab to appear as humorous and nonthreatening as he does 
here in Stubb’s dream. While Moby Dick has only taken a physical part of Ahab, Stubb’s 
dream indicates that Ahab has little authority on his own ship. As further support of this, 
at the start of “Ahab’s Boat and Crew. Fedallah,” Stubb and Flask argue about the 
usefulness of Ahab’s leg: 
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‘Who would have thought it, Flask!’ cried Stubb; ‘if it had but one leg you 
would not catch me in a boat, unless maybe to stop the plug-hole with my 
timber tow. Oh! he’s a wonderful old man!’ ‘I don’t think it so strange, 
after all, on that account,’ said Flask. ‘If his leg were off at the hip, now, it 
would be a different thing. That would disable him; but he has one knee, 
and good part of the other left, you know.’ ‘I don’t know that, my little 
man; I never yet saw him kneel.’ (206) 
Ahab’s loss of authority, evinced by the flippant comments of his crew, derives from the 
loss of his leg. 
 In blaming the whale, Ahab is determined to discover what secret it conceals from 
him, illustrated most directly by his aforementioned plea to the head of a sperm whale for 
knowledge in “The Sphynx.” Ahab looks to whales, specifically Moby Dick, to fill the 
lack brought on by castration, just as the obsessive subject looks to the Other to answer 
his question: What knowledge do you conceal from me that keeps me from fulfilling my 
desire? This is a question asked in vain, though, because the Other is nonexistent; he is 
merely “a set of signifiers: language or speech” (Soler 267). The Other, therefore, is only 
the person that the subject imagines him to be. Because the Other does not exist, his 
secret cannot exist, and the subject cannot know it. Instead, the subject invents a secret in 
the Other, a secret that the subject believes, if only known to him, would bring pleasure. 
This invented secret and the quest to find it serve as the basis for an obsession. 
Fueled by his fantasy, the subject pursues a singular object in the hopes of 
plugging up the hole left by castration, but to no avail. Soler tells us, “The first idea 
emphasized by Lacan is that no object will ever be able to fill the lack brought on by 
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castration. Thus desire is always desire for something else . . . but desire nevertheless 
always searches for the same thing . . . Desire is precisely determined in the fantasy 
where it is linked with an object particular to each individual subject” (Soler 271). Trying 
to learn the Other’s secret necessarily begets anxiety because the Other’s secret, an 
invention, cannot be known. To understand this anxiety, one might look to an example 
from Lacan. In this example, you have on a mask, but do not know what the mask looks 
like. Meanwhile, a gigantic praying mantis, a female, draws nearer to you. If your mask is 
not that of a male praying mantis, then you have nothing to worry about; however, you 
don’t know that it’s not. Soler explains that it is this uncertainty surrounding our 
relationship to the Other that leads to anxiety (268). In trying to fill the void left by 
castration, the obsessive always gets it wrong, believing one particular object will satisfy 
the Other and make up for his lost jouissance. For this reason, the obsession necessarily 
leads to failure. The obsessive, who invests his energy into the Other, does so 
unnecessarily; his pursuit makes sense only within the context of his own fantasy. 
Castration brings on a void that is met only with another void in the Other. “Tell me your 
secret!” demands the subject to the Other, but the Other simply stares. In response to this 
silence, the obsessive invents the Other’s secret and devotes himself to the impossible 
task of discovering it. 
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If not the Whale, then Who is the Other? 
  
Ahab considers the unseen Other to be the principle of his suffering, and in order 
for this to be true, this Other must have complete control over humanity: one may equate 
it with God. Several instances in Moby Dick support this conclusion. When Ishmael tells 
us that Ahab heaps “upon the whale’s white hump the sum of all the general rage and 
hate felt by his whole race from Adam down,” he suggests that Ahab acts on behalf of all 
of humanity against the same God that cast men out of the Garden of Eden. To Ahab, the 
white whale embodies this creator who is responsible for “all those malicious agencies 
which some deep men feel eating in them.” The white whale stands in for a creator who 
has abandoned his creations, indifferent to their suffering. Ahab, when his leg is torn 
from him, realizes that his God is indifferent. When Starbuck accuses Ahab of 
blasphemy, Ahab responds, “Talk not to me of blasphemy, man; I’d strike the sun if it 
insulted me” (Melville 145). However, “blasphemy” does not adequately describe the 
seriousness of Ahab’s crime. Ahab does not merely disregard God; he actively seeks to 
destroy him. He believes that by injuring the whale he will injure his creator. 
However, to unequivocally conclude from this that the Other in Moby Dick is God 
would be erroneous. I suggest that finding the sublime in God is yet another reduction of 
the unknowable as a way to know it. Ahab initially looks to the secret of whales, making 
Moby Dick his objet petit a. Let us recall momentarily the scene in “The Quarter-Deck” 
when Ahab expresses frustration in response to nature’s mysteries as he explains to 
Starbuck why he would seek vengeance on the whale: 
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All visible objects, man, are but as pasteboard masks. But in each event—
in the living act, the undoubted deed—there, some unknown but still 
reasoning thing puts forth the mouldings of its features from behind the 
unreasoning mask. If man will strike, strike through the mask! How can 
the prisoner reach outside except by thrusting through the wall? To me, 
the white whale is that wall, shoved near to me. (Melville 145) 
Wenke says, “Like any Platonist, Ahab sees the material world as a sign of invisible 
forms. Unlike a Platonist, he believes that malice animates the ‘pasteboard masks’ of 
matter” (Wenke 706). Ahab’s analogy suggests that the prisoner can only “reach outside” 
by attacking the “pasteboard masks” (Melville 145). In other words, one can only get at 
the underlying malicious orchestrator of events by attacking “visible objects” through 
which it acts (145). Though Ahab is wary of physical objects, which take the shape of the 
sea’s “unshored harborless immensities,” he is more wary of the malicious presence 
behind these. For Ahab, if only he could absorb the knowledge of the sperm whale, the 
“visible object,” he could overcome its controller, and thus regain control over his 
circumstances and escape his prison. 
Ahab suggests that the “unknown but still reasoning thing” that “puts forth the 
mouldings of its features from behind the unreasoning mask” is a divine being, one which 
is ultimately responsible for human suffering. He directly blames divine influence in 
“The Log and Line.” In this chapter, Ahab takes Pip’s hand, befriending him, and as he 
does this, he chastises the gods for their cruelty: “Oh, ye frozen heavens! Look down 
here. Ye did beget this luckless child, and have abandoned him, ye creative libertines” 
(462). When Pip tells Ahab he will not let go of his hand, Ahab responds, 
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Oh, boy, nor will I thee, unless I should thereby drag thee to worse horrors 
than are here. Lo! ye believers in gods all goodness, and in man all ill, lo 
you! see the omniscient gods oblivious of suffering man; and man, though 
idiotic, and knowing not what he does, yet full of the sweet things of love 
and gratitude. (462) 
Ahab contrasts “omniscient gods” who are “oblivious of suffering man” with “idiotic” 
man who is “full of the sweet things of love and gratitude” in spite of his idiocy. For 
Ahab, then, the whale does not stand in for the terrifying “colorless, all-color . . . 
atheism” or the sublime; it stands in for God. However, God and the sublime are not 
synonymous, because the word “God” anthropomorphizes an entity that cannot be so 
reduced. Ahab refuses to accept that there exists something fundamentally unknowable 
about reality, and thus God becomes another objet petit a that separates him from the 
unfathomable infinite. Other possible interpretations of whale, including the Devil, are 
just as flawed as calling the whale “God.” The concept of the Devil, like that of God, can 
be apprehended by human consciousness and stands in for the inscrutable mystery we 
find impossible to express. Thus, God becomes yet another “pasteboard mask” or objet 
petit a and is, like the whale, an insufficient representation of the sublime. 
  
 Conclusion  
I Know Him Not, and Never Will: Two Responses to the Sublime 
  
  I have alluded to Ahab and Ishmael’s different responses to sublimity, and how 
these determine why, despite their similar interests in the sublime, the former becomes 
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obsessed with Moby Dick and the latter does not. In my final comments, I will explore 
the reasons why their reactions differ so drastically. 
Both Ahab and Ishmael pursue the white whale and engage in whale hunting 
despite previous traumatic experiences, and both pore over books, diagrams, maps, and 
other records in a futile effort to understand. They exhibit a simultaneous attraction to 
and repulsion from their mysteries and are obsessed with knowing the secrets of nature; 
however, their methods in pursuing this knowledge differentiate one from the other. 
Ishmael and Ahab exhibit two very different responses to that feeling of powerlessness 
that the sublime evokes in them. It seems likely that Ahab would have a similar degree of 
interest in the painting at the Spouter-Inn, but how would he have acted on this curiosity? 
Would he ask the patrons for their interpretations as Ishmael does, or would he thrust his 
peg-leg through the canvas? 
 I maintain that Ahab and Ishmael choose two separate paths after their encounters 
with the sublime; the first chooses the path that leads to insane obsession and the other 
avoids it. The conspicuous presence of Ahab’s unconscious indicates that Ahab willingly 
hands agency over to this darker part of himself, or in Ishmael’s terms, “push[es] . . . off 
from that isle” into “all the horrors of the half-known life.” I alluded to the possibility 
that Ahab must have reflected upon his situation before he went mad, just as Pip spent an 
hour alone in the ocean before he lost his wits. I see the development of Ahab’s obsession 
within this period of reflection. When Moby Dick takes Ahab’s leg, Ahab experiences a 
traumatic encounter with the sublime, a castration that leaves him, as a sublime encounter 
will do, feeling feeble. This immediate reaction to a sublime experience, I argue, is where 
Ahab and Ishmael, on the same path previously, diverge to embrace different fates. 
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Two aspects separate Ahab and Ishmael. The first of these is an acknowledgement 
of the fallibility of the human mind. Wenke contrasts “Ahab’s fixed theory of reality” 
with “Ishmael’s multiple formulations,” arguing that Ishmael’s perception of reality is in 
constant flux, while Ahab’s is immovable (Wenke 706). Ishmael considers that his own 
current conceptions may be inaccurate or insufficient; his willingness to consult others 
after his encounter with the Spouter-Inn painting exhibits this. In “Selfhood and Others,” 
Paul Brodtkorb Jr. points out Ishmael’s rapidly evolving interpretation of Ahab’s 
nightmare episodes in “The Chart”: 
The conceptual gist of this difficult passage would seem to be that, when 
asleep, Ahab’s soul, temporarily dissociated from what has insanely used 
it, rebels. Yet the judiciously analytic Ishmael faced with Ahab’s psychic 
profundities does not simplify this analysis to any such ‘gist.’ The passage 
is full of complex abstractions, qualifications, extensions, synonyms with 
subtle distinctions implied between them, and second thoughts. (Brodtkorb 
Jr. 672) 
In this chapter, Ishmael adopts and rejects different hypotheses about the structure of 
Ahab’s mind, and he allows his analysis of Ahab’s nightmares to change; he accepts 
previous interpretations as incorrect as he adopts new ones. Brodtkorb Jr. says, “The 
whole passage . . . shows Ishmael unable to create and revise sufficiently quickly enough 
static abstractions to keep up with the shifting complexity that is his experience of Ahab 
(672-623). Ahab, in contrast, will not allow his fixity of purpose to waver; he cannot 
change his mind, because changing his mind would require an admission of error. As 
Wenke tells us, “Unlike Ishmael, with his expansive, flexible voice and sensibility, Ahab 
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articulates a philosophical rhetoric of narrow definition. His speech and actions usually 
generate from unwavering principles” (Wenke 706). 
Second, Ahab and Ishmael are separated by an admittance of human weakness in 
the face of the sublime. According to Kant’s definition, no object is universally sublime, 
because sublime objects come about “not so much [from] the nature of external things 
that arouse them as upon each person’s own disposition to be moved by these to pleasure 
and pain” (qtd. in Caygill 379). Thus, what is sublime to Ishmael may not be sublime to 
Ahab and vice versa. Their reactions to a potentially sublime object determine the 
presence of obsession in Ahab but its lack in Ishmael. The former’s reaction is a rejection 
of the inferiority he feels in the presence of a sublime object, and the latter’s reaction is 
just the opposite: one of humility. Ishmael repeatedly expresses a great reverence for 
whales, elevating them at times even above human beings: 
When I stand among these mighty Leviathan skeletons, skulls, tusks, jaws, 
ribs, and vertebrae . . . I am, by a flood, borne back to that wondrous 
period, ere time itself can be said to have begun . . . Then the whole world 
was the whale’s; and, king of creation, he left his wake among the present 
lines of the Andes and the Himmalehs. Who can show a pedigree like the 
whale’s? Methuselah seems a schoolboy . . . I am horror-struck at this 
antemosaic, unsourced existence of the unspeakable terrors of the whale, 
which, having been before all time, must needs exist after all humane ages 
are over. (Melville 408) 
Ahab, in contrast, does not hold the whale in such high regard. He rejects the feeling of 
inferiority that the sublime evokes in him, and he denies that the whale has injured his 
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“proper and inaccessible being”: “Aye! and all splintered to pieces, Stubb!—d'ye see 
it.—But even with a broken bone, old Ahab is untouched; and I account no living bone of 
mine one jot more me, than this dead one that's lost. Nor white whale, nor man, nor fiend, 
can so much as graze old Ahab in his own proper and inaccessible being” (495). He 
claims that while the whale injured his leg, “Ahab’s soul’s a centipede, that moves upon a 
hundred legs” (497). 
 Ahab thus blames a “dumb brute” for his misfortune, and invests his energy into 
destroying him, even though he can never destroy the responsible cause: human 
vulnerability. He locates the loss of his pleasure in an object, the whale; the secret, the 
whale, and the objet petit a become interchangeable terms, as I have discussed. Having 
misrecognized the whale as the source of his anxiety, Ahab commits himself to a futile 
quest doomed to fail. How, then, does Ishmael avoid this fate? While he does not become 
obsessed with destroying the whale as Ahab does, the whale does become an objet petit a 
for him: he studies two other sublime objects, Ahab and the sea, but he is fixated on the 
whale. His flirtation with Ahab’s obsession, and his eventual avoidance of it is mirrored 
in the book’s final pages. At the novel’s close, the vortex created by the sinking Pequod 
nearly sucks Ishmael down into the sea; the ship “like Satan, would not sink to hell till 
she had dragged a living part of heaven along with her” (508). Moby Dick leaves him an 
“orphan” (509). In spite of Ishmael’s trauma, he does not become obsessed; he is not 
sucked into the whale’s vortex. I argue that by the end of Ishmael’s story, he has 
recognized the whale for an objet petit a, or, in other words, has realized the dangers of 
pursuing an objet petit a, of locating one’s loss of pleasure in the Other. This realization 
saves obsessive Ishmael from the fate of pathologically obsessive Ahab. 
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